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Abstract—This paper studies a fundamental problem regard-
ing the security of blockchain on how the existence of multiple
misbehaving pools influences the profitability of selfish mining.
Each selfish miner maintains a private chain and makes it public
opportunistically for the purpose of acquiring more rewards
incommensurate to his Hashrate. We establish a novel Markov
chain model to characterize all the state transitions of public and
private chains. The minimum requirement of Hashrate together
with the minimum delay of being profitable is derived in close-
form. The former reduces to 21.48% with the symmetric selfish
miners, while their competition with asymmetric Hashrates puts
forward a higher requirement of the profitable threshold. The
profitable delay increases with the decrease of the Hashrate
of selfish miners, making the mining pools more cautious on
performing selfish mining.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin has gained tremendous concerns as the first fully
decentralized cryptocurrency since its advent in 2008. All
historical transactions between Bitcoin clients are recorded in
a global and public data structure known as the blockchain.
The security of the blockchain is established by a chain of
cryptographic Hash puzzles, addressed by a large-scale net-
work of pseudonymous participants called miners [1]. Solving
a Hash puzzle is deemed as a way to generate Proof-of-Work
(PoW) of reaching global consensus. The PoW of Bitcoin de-
mands intensive computations, thus consuming a lot of energy.
Each miner competes for this “game”, and is rewarded by
cryptocurrencies (i.e. bitcoins) if he is the first acknowledged
miner to find a valid block. When the population of miners is
large, the aggregate Hash power is sufficiently high such that
a malicious miner can hardly accumulate enough Hash power
to perform Sybil attacks. The PoW consensus of Bitcoin has
been employed in almost 90% of public blockchains, serving
as the cornerstone of current cryptocurrencies.
The security of PoW is challenged by the trend of cen-
tralization of Hash power. Mining a Bitcoin block is random
and it needs more than 10 years on average with a latest-
generation ASIC chip. Therefore, blockchain miners operate
strategically to form pools that have a much larger chance of
solving puzzles in each round. By splitting the mining reward
appropriately, they acquire a stable income rate. As a side
effect, a small number of mining pools occupy a vast majority
of global Hash power, placing blockchain systems at the risk
of being overthrown by a gigantic pool or colluding pools. The
conventional wisdom believes that PoW is secure as long as no
miner controls 51% of total Hash power. However, a miner can
choose a selfish mining scheme instead of conforming to the
standard Bitcoin protocol. Eyal and Sirer pointed out that the
selfish mining is profitable (i.e. more rewards than the honest
mining) if the Hash power of a miner is larger than 25% [2]. A
more intelligent selfish miner using Markov Decision Process
(MDP) can lower down this threshold to around 23.21% [8].
Note that the both studies assume the existence of a single
selfish miner while multiple (colluding) pools might be close
to this profitable threshold.
In this paper, we study a fundamental question regarding the
blockchain security: Will selfish mining become more easily
profitable when there exist more than one selfish miners, and
how many rounds should a selfish miner wait until being
profitable? The former subquestion aims to unravel whether
each selfish miners needs a smaller threshold of Hashrate to
gain more rewards than mining honestly. The latter pays atten-
tion to the transient behavior in the process of selfish mining
that takes into account the mining difficulty adjustment. The
transient analysis is also crucial for a selfish miner is inclined
to waiting for a long period to gain more rewards, especially
when the global Hashrate increases rapidly. We establish the
selfish mining model for an honest pool that represents all
honest miners, and two selfish mining pools who are not
aware of each other’s misbehaving role. By dissecting all the
possible events that trigger the change of private and public
chains, we formulate a set of Markov chains to capture all
the state transitions. In contrast to a very recent experimental
study [3] that analyzes the profitable threshold of selfish
mining with two miners, our work presents a mathematical
model that yields close-form expression of such a threshold.
In the transient analysis, the selfish mining is found of wasting
computing power and thus is definitely unworthy without the
subsequent difficulty adjustment of puzzle-solving.
The major contributions and observations are summarized
as below.
• We establish a set of Markov chain models to characterize
the state transition of public and private chains in selfish
mining and compute the steady state distributions.
• The minimum threshold of Hashrate is symmetric around
21.48% if two selfish miners are both profitable. While
the profitable selfish mining becomes more difficult when
one of the selfish miner increases his Hashrate, arousing
a more furious competition.
• The selfish mining is profitable after 51 rounds of diffi-
culty adjustment (i.e. 714 days in Bitcoin) if the Hashrates
of selfish miners are both 22% (slightly higher than the
profitably threshold). This delay decreases to 5 rounds
(i.e. 70 days in Bitcoin) as their Hashrates accrues to
33%, which is still very long.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the basic model of blockchain
mining in the presence of two adversarial pools.
A. System Description
Consider a blockchain mining system with two misbehaving
mining pools Alice and Bob, as well as an honest mining
pool, Henry1. They compete to solve cryptographic puzzles
to mine a valid block for the purpose of acquiring bitcoin-like
rewards. The proof-of-work (PoW) consensus is adopted and
the mining of blocks is stateless: the probability of discovering
a block by a miner is proportional to his current Hashrate,
but inversely proportional to the current aggregate Hashrate
of the entire blockchain network. The blockchain system
dynamically adjusts the difficulty of cryptographic puzzles
such that new blocks are generated at a fixed average rate(e.g.
one block per 10 minutes on average in Bitcoin). We define a
“round” as the time to process one attack. The miners maintain
a globally-agreed ordered set of transactions via the adoption
and the mining on the longest chain. The revenue of a miner
is the expected fraction of blocks mined by him out of all the
blocks in the longest chain
For the simplicity, we make the following assumptions that
are consistent with the literature [2].
• The total Hashrate of the blockchain system is normal-
ized as a unit. Then, the Hashrate of a mining pool is
represented as a fraction of the total.
• The block discovery time by a mining pool is exponen-
tially distributed when his Hashrate is large.
• The reward of each valid block is normalized as one
cryptographic coin.
Denote by α1, α2 and αh the Hashrates of Alice, Bob and
Henry respectively, i.e. α1+α2+αh = 1. Denote by γ1 (resp.
γ2) the probability that honest miners mine after Alice’s (resp.
Bob’s) released chain in the tie-breaking between Alice (resp.
Bob) and Hence. Denote by θ1 and θ2 the probabilities that
honest moners choose to mine after Alice’s and Bob’s chains in
the three-party tie-breaking, respectively. When the blockchain
system creates a new block, it is mined by pool i with the
probability αi , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, h}, owing to the memorylessness
of exponentially distributed mining intervals.
Alice (resp. Bob) may release her blocks strategically by
forcing Henry into wasting his computations. When Alice
and Bob are both selfish miners, the interaction between two
private chains becomes more complicated because none of
them know other’s behaviour. In what follows, we capture all
the different states that each miner may encounter.
B. Selfish Mining Mode
Alice maintains a private chain, so does Bob, while Henry
operates on the public chain. Alice and Bob are not aware of
each other’s role. We suppose that all the miners work on the
same public chain in the beginning where the starting point is
1Multiple honest miners can be boiled down to a single miner for the sake
of their linear additivity of Hashrates.
expressed as “0”. The length of the private chain is kept as a
private information by Alice and Bob, and the length of the
public chain is observed by all of them. We consider the selfish
mining method proposed by [2], and our analytical approach
can be generalized to a variety of other methods.
The mining procedure consists of two cases as follows.
• (Public-chain mining case) Henry always mines after the
public chain. Alice or Bob also mines on the public chain
if it is longer than his private chain.
• (Private-chain mining case) Alice (resp. Bob) continues
to mine on her (resp. his) private chain if she (resp. he)
discovers a new block and the private chain is now longer
than the public chain.
The release procedure is more complicated than the mining
procedure. Henry broadcasts his mined block as soon as it is
discovered, while Alice and Bob will decide whether to release
their mined blocks depending on the length of the public chain.
• (Forfeit case) Alice (resp. Bob) abandons her (resp. his)
private chain and conforms to mining after the public
chain if the latter is longer. Henry also abandons his
public chain if Alice or Bob publishes a longer chain.
• (Risk-avoiding release case) Alice (resp. Bob) releases
her (resp. his) privately mined blocks to the public
because of the fear of loss if the new block is mined
by the others and the leading advantage of her private
chain is no more than two blocks.
• (Chain reaction case) When Alice (resp. Bob) releases
her (resp. his) blocks to the public chain and updates its
length, the release of Bob’s (resp. Alice’s) private blocks
is triggered immediately.
The chain reaction case is the combination of the forfeit
and the risk-avoiding cases, whereas the existence of chain
reaction complicates evolution of the public chain. Suppose
that Alice publishes her private blocks to obsolete the current
public chain. After the construction of new public chain, Bob
may release his private chain to forfeit it immediately.
C. Release procedure and tie-breaking Logics
The consensus on the public chain requires that it is the
longest. A crucial question is how the public chain evolves
when it is of the same length as Alice or Bob. In general,
each miner works on his own chain, and the release behavior
of Alice and Bob is triggered when Henry mines a new block.
We hereby illustrate the evolution of private and public chains
where Ak, Bk, and Hk denote that the kth blocks belong
to Alice, Bob and Henry respectively. The blocks of private
chains are in grey and those of public chains are in white.
Risk-avoiding release case We show the risk-avoiding release
of Alice’s private chain in Figure 1. Alice is only one block
ahead of Henry after the latter mines a new block for the
public chain. Because Alice fears of losing the competition,
she publishes her private blocks, obseleting Henry’s public
chain, so that both Alice and Henry mine on the new longest
chain afterwards.
Tie-breaking resolvings. If Alice’s private chain is only one
block ahead of Henry’s, Henry may catch up with her. When
Fig. 1: Alice’s risk-avoiding release and Henry’s abandonment.
it happens, Alice publishes her private blocks immediately to
compete with Henry. Thus, two public chains of the same
length exist in Figure 2. Since only one public chains prevails,
a tie-breaking rule needs to be taken into account. The first
case is that the public chains of Alice and Henry have the same
length, and Bob’s private chain is either 0 or very long. Hence,
we only need to resolve the tie between Alice and Henry. All
the miners are possible to mine after block A1, while Bob
and Henry may mine after H1. There are five possibilities of
extending the longest public chain, and the shorter one will be
obsoleted. We omit the tie-breaking between Bob and Henry
because this can be analyzed in the same way.
Fig. 2: Tie-breaking case of two public chains.
For the situation that each of Alice and Bob hides one
private block, they will publish their private chains instantly
after Henry finds a new block. As shown in Figure 3, there
exists three competing public chains. Alice will mine after
A1 and Bob will mine after B1 for sure; Henry is not aware
of which chain is maliciously forked so that he may mine on
each public chains. There are also five possible situations. The
risk-avoiding release, together with two tie-breaking solutions,
constitutes all the dynamics of private and public chains.
Fig. 3: Tie-breaking case of three public chains.
Chain reaction release. We next introduce the chain reaction
release that complicates the evolution of the private and public
chains. Note that the chain reaction release consists of a
sequence of risk-avoiding releases and tie-breaking resolvings.
Figure 4 illustrates an example on how the chain reaction
phenomenon is triggered. At stage 1, Alice’s private chain
contains four blocks while the lengths of Bob’s private chain
Fig. 4: Chain reaction case.
and Henry’s public chain are 0. After a tie-breaking resolving
at stage 2, the longer public chain contains two blocks B1 and
H2, and the shorter is orphaned. Bob construct a new private
chain starting from B3 to B8, while Henry continues to mine
one block after H2 at stage 4. From Alice’s perspective, her
private chain is merely one block ahead of the public chain.
She releases her private blocks in order to avoid the risk of
losing the race with Henry. The new public chain now starts
from block A4. Next, stage 5 and 6 constitute a new round of
tie-breaking resolving between Alice and Henry, extending the
public chain to block A7. However, the release of A7 triggers
Bob to release all of his private blocks starting from B3 to B8.
When retrospecting all the mining stages, we observe that the
winning branch switches back and forth, making the analysis
of selfish mining extremely complicated.
III. FINITE STATE MACHINE
In this section, we construct the state machine of blockchain
selfish mining and present the steady-state and transient anal-
ysis of the profitable threshold.
A. Steady-state Analysis
Fig. 5: State machine with N=2.
We hereby formulate a finite state machine to characterize
the evolution of private and public chains. Figure 5 illustrates
the state machine when the maximum length of private chain is
two (i.e. N=2). We define the state as a three-tuple consisting
of the lengths of Alice, Bob and Henry. The arrows indicate
the corresponding state transitions and the associated values
represent the transition probabilities. For instance, all the
transitions to (0, 0, 0) mean that the forked chains boil down to
the unanimous public chain and a new round of selfish mining
starts. Denote by Pijk the steady state distribution of (i, j, k).
Denote by R1 (resp. R2, Rh) the average number of valid
blocks mined by Alice (resp. Bob, Henry). Using the standard
approach, we obtain Ri as follows [5].
P−1000 = 1+α1+α2+α1αh+2α1α2+α2αh+2α1α2αh; (1)
R1
P000
=2α21 (1 + αh) + (α2 + αh)α1αhγ1 + α1α2αh
+4α21α2 (1 + αh) + 2α1α2α
2
hθ1; (2)
R2
P000
=2α22 (1 + αh) + (α1 + αh)αhα2γ2 + α1α2αh
+4α22α1 (1 + αh) + 2α1α2α
2
hθ2; (3)
Rh
P000
=α1α
2
h (2− γ1) + 2α1α2α2h (2−θ1 − θ2) + αh
+α2α
2
h (2− γ2) + α1α2αh(2− γ1 − γ2). (4)
When N is large (e.g. three or four), the finite state machine
becomes more complicated. Due to limite space, we leave
the detailed analysis in the technical report [6], while only
presenting the close-form results with N=4.
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2
1αh
+40α41α
2
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3
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3
1α2α
2
h
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2
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2α
2
h (β1 + 20)
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4
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3
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3
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2
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3
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+6α31α
3
2α
2
h (10αhβ1 + 1) ; (5)
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3
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2 + 4α
2
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+40α21α
4
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2
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2
2α
2
hβ2 + α
2
1α
2
2α
3
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+6α31α
3
2α
2
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Rh
P000
=α1α
2
h (2− γ1) + α2α2h (2− γ2) + α21α32α3h (2β1+β2)
+2α1α2α
2
h (2− θ1 − θ2) + α21α22α2h (6 + 4α1α2)
+α31α
2
2α
3
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+α31α
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3
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3
h+2α
4
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4
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β1 = γ1/(γ1 + γ2) β2 = γ2/(γ1 + γ2). (8)
Note that the cases with N>4 are not considered in the
modeling. Apart from their complexity, a large N may cause a
lot of consecutively orphaned blocks so that the selfish mining
can be easily detected. Later on, our simulation confirms
convergence of profitable threshold at N=4, i.e. the difference
between N=4 and a large enough N is very small.
B. Transient State Analysis
According to the data from [4], the Hashrate of the Bitcoin
system grows exponentially. It is necessary to study the
transient behavior of an attack. We model the action during
one difficulty adjustment period and explore the relationship
between the number of periods and the attackers’ Hashrate.
For a better description, we define the concept of absolute
revenue and relative revenue. First, Alice’s, Bob’s and Henry’s
relative revenue are the proportion of their revenue to total
revenue, which are
RA = R1/ (R1 +R2 +Rh) (9)
RB = R2/ (R1 +R2 +Rh) (10)
RH = Rh/ (R1 +R2 +Rh) (11)
Since we ignore the influence of transaction fee and other
factors, miners can only get revenue from published blocks.
Based on this, we define absolute revenue as the number of
valid blocks obtained per unit of time. In Bitcoin system, we
take 10 minutes as unit time.
Through the state machine, in the ith adjustment interval
(eg. difficulty adjustment period), ni blocks will appear on the
longest public chain and mi blocks are mined totally during
one attack round (eg. from stage(0,0,0) back to stage (0,0,0)).
In addition, we use Ti to represent the total time spented in the
ith adjustment interval. Considering the change of computing
power, the Si is used to represent the Hashrate of total system,
the mathi and the ti represent the theoretical time and the
actual time that is spent mining one block during the ith
adjustment interval respectively. Take Alice as an example,
we can obtain the following equations:
ni = R1 +R2 +Rh mi = 1 (12)
Eq. (12) give us that it costs T1 during the first difficulty
adjustment period.
T1 = 2016 ∗m1 ∗ t1/n1 math1 = 1 unit time (13)
t1 = math1 ∗ S0/S1 S0 = 1; (14)
After the first period, the system will adjust the difficulty to
satisfy mining one block per ten minutes. We can obtain the
new average time of blocks generation during the ith period.
Alice’s absolute revenue can be expressed as Eq. (15):
Rabsolute =
k∑
i=1
2016 ∗R1
ni
/
k∑
i=1
Ti (15)
Ti = 2016 ∗mi ∗ ti/ni n0 = 1 (16)
mathi = mathi−1 ∗ 2016/Ti−1 t0 = math0 (17)
ti = mathi ∗ Si−1/Si math0 = math1 (18)
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to verify the validity of theoretical analysis, we
compare them with the results of a Bitcoin system simulator
in this section. We set the block generation process to be
exponentially distributed and run the simulator a million times.
Based on the simulation results and theoretical results, we
phrase the following observations:
Observation 1: When there are multiple attackers in Bitcoin
system, the attackers’ minimum profitable thresholds decrease
and the system security is degraded.
Fig. 6: Relative revenue and absolute revenue.
Fig. 7: Bob’s threshold under the influence of Alices Hashrate.
When there is only one attacker in system, [2] proposed
that when there are branches, if γ1=γ2=1/2, the profitable
threshold for attacker is 25% . [3] shows when there are two
attackers with same Hashrate, the profit threshold will be lower
than 25% and it is easier to launch selfish-mining. We model
this process with state machine shown in section III and the
mathematical model verify this conclusion well.
We consider the situation that γ1=γ2=1/2 and θ1=θ2=1/3.
Driving Eq. (10), we can obtain that when Alice’s Hashrate
is 16%, Bob’s profitable threshold can reach the minimum:
21.06%. When Alice’s Hashrate is less than 16%, the deriva-
tive of Eq. (10) is greater than 0, which means that Bob’s
threshold relative to Alices Hashrate is monotonically decreas-
ing. When Alice’s Hashrate is more than 16%, the derivative
of Eq. (10) is less than 0, which means that Bobs threshold
relative to Alice’s Hashrate is monotonically increasing. In
Figure 7, the blue curve represents the theoretical result and
the red dots represent the simulation results. Three blue curves
represent three cases: N is 2, 3 and 4. We can observe that
when Alice’s Hashrate is around 16%, Bob’s threshold can
be minimum. Through calculation and simulation, attackers’
profitable threshold is 27%, 23% and 22% when N is 2, 3
and 4 respectively if Alice and Bob own the same Hashrate.
It shows that when there are two attackers, they can adopt
strategies to successfully attack with less than 25% of total
Hashrate.
Figure 11 also proves this result. The blue curve and the
red curve represent that when there is only one attacker(we
call it situation 1) and two attackers(we call it situation 2) in
Bitcoin system, the relationship between N and threshold. It
shows that under same condition, the threshold of situation 1
is always higher than the threshold of situation 2.
After [2] published, people realized that the mining pool
with more than 25% of the Hashrate can successfully attack,
so the system constrains the Hashrate of the mining pool to
defend against the attack. We prove that this is not enough
through the state machine model. In fact, it’s much easier to
attack than our current cognition. The Bitcoin system is easier
to be attacked and its security is much more fragile.
Observation 2: If N is no larger than 4, there is a negative
correlation between Bob’s lowest profitable threshold and N
while his revenue and N are positively correlated. In the
Bitcoin system, whether there is one attacker or two attackers,
the profitable threshold will converge with the growth of N .
The lowest threshold is decreasing as N becomes larger. We
use Figure 8, Figure 9 and Figure 10 to describe the revenue
situations. Those three images represent Bob’s revenue when
two attackers’ Hashrate are changing separately. Since we
consider γ1 = γ2 = 1/2 and θ1 = θ2 = 1/3 in this current
situation, Alice’s and Bob’s revenue are symmetrical. In these
figures, blue part is the revenue and purple part highlights the
moment Bob can gain additional income from the attack, in
other words, the intersection of the blue and the purple parts
is the threshold curve in Figure 7.
In Figure 11, situation 1 shows that when there is only one
attacker, with the increase of N , the threshold convergences
to 25%. The convergence process tends to be smooth when
attacker can own more than 5 private blocks. Situation 2 shows
that when there are two attackers in system, the relationship
between N and threshold is consistent with one attacker, also
a convergence process and its convergence speed is much
faster. When N is 4, it reaches the convergence balance, with
threshold at 21.48%. Situation 3 and situation 4 show that
when Alice owns 25% and 30% Hashrate, Bob’s threshold
will also be a convergence process.
That’s because without destroying the normal operation of
the system, Henry’s Hashrate is at majority (this premise
will be explained rationality in the next part). Based on
this premise, in the real world situation, attackers can have
small probability to own many private blocks and always take
the leading position. Hiding more private blocks can indeed
increase attackers’ revenue. However, a long private chain will
easily expose the identity of the attacker, since a longer private
chain can make it easier to distinguish it from normal blocks
when they are published. On the other hand, without knowing
the existence of another attacker, if N is large, the risk to lose
all it’s private blocks gets higher. For the sake of insurance,
the attacker might choose to disclose the number of private
blocks to a certain extent to obtain corresponding income. In
addition, this strategy can also rule out the impact of double-
spending. Based on the above reasons, it is better to publish all
private blocks once the length of private chain reaches 4, and
start the next round of attack. [7] proposes that if we set up the
timeliness of the block, we can effectively resist selfish mining
attacks. The convergence of the threshold proves that this
method is ineffective in current Bitcoin system, this is because
in the current blockchain system, we default to a transaction
requiring 6 valid blocks to be confirmed. Unfortunately, the
Fig. 8: Alice’s revenue w.r.t. Alice and
Bob’s Hashrate with N=2.
Fig. 9: Alice’s revenue w.r.t. Alice and
Bob’s Hashrate with N=3.
Fig. 10: Alice’s revenue w.r.t. Alice
and Bob’s Hashrate with N=4.
Fig. 11: Threshold convergence process. Fig. 12: Upper limit. Fig. 13: Profitable time and Hashrate.
threshold can reach convergence before six blocks.
Observation 3: In order to ensure the attack can proceed
normally, αh > max{α1, α2} must be satisfied
As a counterexample, if Alice has the highest Hashrate, and
there is no limit to the length of private chain, Alice can hide
her private chain as long as possible. She can stay in the lead
in most cases during the attack, which will lead to Alice’s
private chain becoming the only valid chain. In this case, Bob
and Henry will choose to stop mining to reduce losses. We can
speculate that under this circumstance, Alice’s revenue can be
close to 100% and her attack actually becomes meaningless.
This kind of attack is similar to 51% attack. Simulation results
also prove this. In Figure 12, when Alice’s Hashrate is 45%,
Bob’s Hashrate is 25% and Henry’s Hashrate is 35%, we
obtained situation 1. When Alice’s Hashrate is 45%, Bob’s
Hashrate is 35%, and Henry’s Hashrate is 25%, we obtained
situation 2. It shows that the longer attacker’s private chain is,
the more he can gain. As long as one attacker has the highest
Hashrate, this situation could happen, regardless of how many
Hashrate other miners have. According to this analysis, it is
very meaningful to stipulate that Henry should have the highest
Hashrate in the attack model.
Observation 4: The attackers will fail during the first diffi-
culty adjustment period regardless of the attackers’ Hashrate.
However, he might gain profit after several periods, which is
related to the attackers’ Hashrate.
Assuming two attackers have the same Hashrate, we sim-
ulated and obtained Figure 6. relative revenue and absolute
revenue are equal within the allowable range of error. There-
fore, we can believe that the relative revenue and absolute
revenue play the same role in representing benefit.
As Eq. (15) shows, when Alice has more Hashrate, she
can get illegal revenue earlier. Figure 13 shows the simulation
results match well with the theoretical result. The horizontal
axis represents the attack round and the ordinate represents
the attackers’ revenue, also the blue curve is theoretical result
and the red dots are simulation results. It shows that when
attackers’ Hashrate is relatively small, it takes a rather long
period to gain profit. That means in the real system, it is a little
bit hard to perform attack. If the global Hashrate increase, we
can also use this formula to calculate when to stop the attack
before we can benefit the most.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study how the existence of multiple misbe-
having pools influences the profitability of selfish mining. By
establishing the Markov chain model to describle the action
of attackers and honest miners, we can obtain the minimum
profitable threshold is symmetric 21.48%. Considering the
difficulty adjustment, we model the transient process and
discover the negative correlation between the profitable time
and the attackers’ mining power.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Nakamoto. “ Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system” , 2008.
[2] I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer. “Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is
vulnerable”. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer,
2014, pp. 436-454.
[3] Q.H. Liu, N. Ruan, et al. “On the Strategy and Behavior of Bitcoin
Mining with N-attackers”. Proc. of the Asia Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pp. 357-368, 2018.
[4] https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/bitcoin-hashrate.html
[5] A. Papoulis, S. U. Pillai. Probability, random variables, and stochastic
processes[M]. Tata McGraw-Hill Education, 2002.
[6] Technical report. http://medianet.azurewebsites.net/new-page/
[7] R. Pass, E. Shi “Fruitchains: A fair blockchain”. Proc. of the Asia Con-
ference on Computer Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing,
pp. 315-324, 2017.
[8] A. Sapirshtein, Y. Sompolinsky, A. Zohar. “Optimal selfish mining strate-
gies in bitcoin”. International Conference on Financial Cryptography and
Data Security, pp. 515-532, 2016.
